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The financialisation of nonfinancial corporations has drawn the attention of many scholars who 
have identified two main channels through which financialisation occurs: a higher proportion of 
financial assets compared to nonfinancial ones and a higher amount of resources diverted to 
financial markets. A consequence of this process is a decrease in investment. Parallel to 
financialisation, many nonfinancial corporations have also engaged in an internationalisation of 
their productive activities, organizing them under global value chains. Though offshoring may also 
explain the decrease in the level of investment of nonfinancial firms, the intersections between the 
literature on financialisation and the literature on global value chain remain surprisingly 
underdeveloped. This paper contributes to fill this gap using panel regressions for U.S. nonfinancial 
corporations between 1995 and 2011. We find evidence that both offshoring and financialisation 
are determinants to the decrease in investment and that financialisation occurs mainly amongst 
firms belonging to sectors prone to offshoring. 
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1. Introduction 
A decrease in the level of aggregate investment coupled with high profits has been a systematic 
trend among developed countries since the ‘80s. This phenomenon presented a puzzle for 
heterodox economics, whether Marxists or Post Keynesians, given expectations for a positive 
relationship between investment and profits (Stockhammer, 2005). In its Post Keynesian version, 
the solution to the puzzle lies in other sources of effective demand that allow profits to be realized 
at the macroeconomic level, such as the increase in capitalists’ consumption (Cordonnier, 2006), 
government deficits and external surpluses (Van Treeck, 2009). At the microeconomic level, the 
´investment-profit puzzle´ is usually described as a consequence of shareholder value orientation, 
either by shifting firms’ goals to profits instead of growth (Stockhammer, 2005) or to higher 
preferences for free cash flows and payouts (Dallery, 2009). These assertions have inspired a large 
number of empirical studies (Barradas, 2017; Clévenot, Guy, & Mazier, 2010; Hecht, 2014; 
Orhangazi, 2008; Stockhammer, 2004; Tori & Onaran, 2018) which showed the negative 
correlation between increased payouts and real investment for different countries. Ultimately, 
part of the sources for increased distribution of profits came at the expense of investment. Figure 
1 illustrates this negative correlation for the USA by showing the ratio between gross fixed 
investment and net financial payouts for the whole economy, and listed firms. In both cases the 
trend is similar: it abruptly decreases since the beginnings of the ‘80s, remains relatively constant 
until the end of the ‘90s when it increases and then declines sharply again. The figure also 
indicates that the trend for listed companies started from a higher point than the whole economy. 
All in all, this suggests that the decrease in investment has been more dramatic for listed firms. 
Even though the explanations at the micro level that rest on the consequences of shareholder 
value orientation are consistent with stylized facts, they provide no clue to answer another 
question: that of the sustainability of low investment and high payouts considering that today’s 
firm capital accumulation is a prerequisite for tomorrow’s profitability (Dallery, 2009; Lavoie, 
2014). 
[Figure 1. Investment calculated as a ratio of Net Financial Payouts for the U.S. Economy and U.S. 
listed firms and Offshoring Intensity, 1946-2016] 
The aim of this paper is to show, empirically, one of the conditions that has made such strategy 
sustainable over the past years: the offshoring of production2. This proposition is motivated by 
 
2 Offshoring is part of a broader process of productive reconfiguration carried mainly through the so-called 
global value chains2 (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994), which implies both spatial relocation –home 
nation/offshoring– and organizational restructuring –in-house/outsourcing– (Contractor, Kumar, Kundu, & 
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previous work by Milberg (2008) and Milberg and Winkler (2009, 2013) who indicated that most of 
the gains associated with offshoring were used to sustain financialisation rather than investing in 
productive assets. Following this line of reasoning, figure 1 also shows, along with the negative 
relation between payments and investment, the increased offshoring activity verified since mid 
‘90s. 
In order to fulfil the objective of this paper, we estimate investment functions using world-
consolidated firm-level data for U.S.-listed companies from Compustat merged with industry-level 
information on offshoring from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD). The main issue when 
dealing with offshoring is that comprehensive information is not available for individual firms. 
Rather than studying the offshoring of corporations, we propose to consider the offshoring of their 
industry for which we have reliable information over the 1995-2011 period. The scope of this 
study focuses, therefore, on individual capital accumulation behaviour, conditional on the fact that 
firms belong to industries with various degrees of offshoring. 
Thanks to this empirical strategy, the main contribution of this paper is to show that the negative 
correlation between payouts and investment in capital expenditures underlined by the literature is 
valid mainly for firms belonging to industries with high offshoring in non-core non-energy 
activities. Moreover, investment of firms in low offshoring sectors is not significantly correlated to 
their financial payouts. These results suggest that financialisation and offshoring are related 
phenomenon. By providing the empirical evidence of this interaction, we contribute to the critical 
debate dealing with the context of the shareholder value creation and its consequences on fixed 
capital formation. Financialisation is not a uniform process and, in particular, it occurs differently 
depending on the variety of business models (Lazonick, 2009; Montalban & Sakinç, 2013). In this 
respect, our results imply that the so-called downsize and distribute strategy, in its capital 
accumulation component at least, has been mainly followed by firms belonging to industries well-
integrated in global value chains (GVCs).  
Our econometric estimations are robust to various specifications, and results cohere with previous 
works. First, we know that financialisation is more pronounced for the largest firms (Orhangazi, 
2008). In our sample, both financialisation and its interaction with offshoring manifest mainly for 
large firms. Second, as we explain below, offshoring may have opposite effects on the investment 
of corporations, depending on its organizational setup (in-house or outsourcing, offshoring in core, 
or non-core activities). Basically, we can expect a positive (negative) relationship between 
 
Pedersen, 2011, p. 7; Kinkel, Lay, & Maloca, 2008, p. 247). As we explain below, this article focuses on 
offshoring, keeping in mind its differential effects in case it is carried in-house or outsourced. 
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investment and offshoring in core (non-core) activities since outsourcing may probably occur for 
non-core activities while in-house transfer of production may probably occur for core activities 
(Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). Though the evidence for such effects is not clear-cut, our 
results are in line with these expectations.     
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the literature on the 
financialisation of nonfinancial corporations (NFCs), offshoring and their interaction with profits 
and investment. Section 3 introduces the regression specification and our main hypothesis, while 
section 4 presents the data and estimation methodology. Section 5 shows and discusses the 
results. Section 6 presents robustness checks, while section 7 finishes with some concluding 
remarks. 
2. Financialisation, offshoring, and investment 
2.1. The financialisation of nonfinancial corporations and its 
consequences for investment 
The financialisation of NFCs is usually associated with the change in corporate governance, a topic 
treated by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000). During the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the 
principle of retain (profits) and reinvest (in physical capital and human resources) shifted toward 
downsize and distribute. As a consequence of this, an increased proportion of funds started to be 
transferred to shareholders through dividends and, especially for the US, share buybacks. Figure 2 
displays the trend of these financial payouts combined for the U.S. economy and our sample of 
listed firms from Compustat. The trajectory is similar in both cases: a stable pattern during the ‘70s 
is followed by a discrete increase during the ‘80s, a small decrease during the ‘90s, finishing with a 
clear upward trend in the ‘00s. 
[Figure 2. Net financial payouts as percentage of operating surplus for the U.S. Economy and U.S. 
listed firms, 1971-2016] 
The financialisation literature highlights another change regarding NFCs which is the increased 
acquisition of financial assets from which NFCs started deriving a growing proportion of financial 
income. Crotty (2005), Orhangazi (2008), Krippner (2011) and Davis (2016) claim that, due to 
different problems faced by U.S. NFCs at the end of the ‘70s and beginning of the ‘80s (high labor 
militancy at home and increased international competition abroad, slower global aggregate 
demand growth and increased exchange rate volatility), firms started to withdraw capital from 
production and divert it to financial markets buying financial assets and financial subsidiaries, or 
starting new financial arms themselves. In Stockhammer (2004) and Tomaskovic-Devey et al 
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(2015), the emphasis is put on a shift in management preferences caused by the hostile take-over 
movement and changes in pay structure which aligned their interests with shareholders´. Due to 
these transformations, non-financial business became more rentier-like abandoning growth-
oriented priorities and investing in financial markets. 
A number of scholars has tried to assess, econometrically, the effect of those channels by adding 
financialisation-related variables to an investment function based on the seminal work done by 
Fazzari et al. (1988) (Table 1). The idea is that both of these channels have a negative impact since 
financial payouts, including interest expenses, represent a drain of resources that could be used 
for investment purposes while financial income derives from financial investment which crowds 
out real investment. Another financialisation-related variable that is usually included is a measure 
of debt, usually long term debts, to indicate the extent of financial fragility of the firm.  
[Table 1. Financialisation variables in investment functions] 
In terms of variables considered, Table 1 shows that their number has evolved over time and with 
the use of firm level information. The latter has allowed to consider a fundamental variable in the 
financialisation story, at least for the USA: share buybacks. In terms of results, regardless of the 
country and whether it is a macro or micro analysis, all studies find at least one channel that 
negatively affects investment, although the negative effect of financial payments is more 
persistent. Regarding the effect of debt on investment, results are ambiguous because debt may 
be a source of capital funding. Kliman and Williams (2014) claim also that funds distributed to 
shareholders have come mainly from debt rather than investment. That is why it is important to 
control for long term debt and new debt issue when estimating investment functions. 
The crowding out thesis has recently been reconsidered in some papers. Fiebiger (2016) claims 
that, for the USA, even though FDI is classified as a financial asset in the national accounts, its 
increase would support the thesis of an internationalisation of the NFC rather than its 
financialisation. Davis’ (2017) econometric results show a positive relation of financial assets and 
the financial profit rate with investment. She interprets them, respectively, as due to the greater 
flexibility provided by liquid financial assets in order to support real investment, and the possible 
complementarities between the financial and nonfinancial components of their business (for 
example, store-issued credit cards supporting the sales of non-financial products). Taking into 
account that the measure of financial assets used by Davis (2017) contains `cash and short-term 
investments’, the result is not surprising and rather standard since Fazarri et al. (1988) show, 
empirically, the importance of internal cash to smooth investment when firms are financially 
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constrained. This result also goes in line with Post Keynesian models of accumulation which stress 
the importance of internal finance for investment (Eichner, 1976; Galbraith, 1968). In the same 
line, even if Hecht (2014) explains that internal cash balances may be used for capital expenditures 
or payments of interests and dividends, he finds that they are positively correlated with 
investment.  
Specifically for the USA, Orhangazi (2008) finds significant negative elasticities, especially for large 
firms. For them, financial payouts and financial income present a negative and significant effect of 
0.06 and 0.08 respectively, while for small firms it is 0.04 and 0.06. Davis (2017) also finds a 
negative and significant effect of financial payouts for larger firms, with stock repurchases defined 
at the industry level. Similarly, Hecht (2014) finds negative and significant elasticities of interest 
expenses and cash dividends of 0.04 and 0.02 while financial income is nonsignificant. The 
negative correlation between financial payouts and investment seems to be a robust result while 
the negative effect of financial income or financial assets is a fragile conclusion. Only in the case of 
Schoder (2014) do results go in an opposite direction than the rest of the literature finding positive 
and significant effects for both types of channels, although for some measures of financial payouts 
results are negative. Given these contrasting results, the investment function we introduce in 
section 3.1 presents an opportunity to test the robustness of the financialisation thesis, at least 
since the mid-nineties, which is close to the period taken by Hecht (2014). We will check this 
robustness by introducing other variables to capture an important determinant of capital 
expenditures that has been overlooked in these investment functions: the offshoring of 
production.  
2.2. Benefits from offshoring and its effect on investment  
As we mentioned in the introduction, global production is organized mainly through GVCs today 
(OECD, 2010), resulting in a fundamental restructuring through offshoring and outsourcing (Lee & 
Gereffi, 2015). We will be following OECD’s definition (OECD, 2010, p. 220): “offshoring is generally 
defined as companies’ purchases of intermediate goods and services from foreign providers at 
arm’s length or the transfer of particular tasks within the firm to a foreign location, i.e. to foreign 
affiliates. Outsourcing refers to the purchasing of intermediate goods and services from outside 
specialist providers at arm’s length either nationally or internationally”. The combination of 
offshoring and outsourcing gives four possibilities described in Table 2. 
[Table 2. Definition of offshoring and outsourcing] 
Multinational Corporations play a key role in this process as the leaders of the whole network 
whereas the dominant consideration in order to engage in such strategy is still to reduce wages 
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and costs3 (Contractor, Kumar, Kundu, & Pedersen, 2011). In fact, while stagnation of wages in 
advanced countries and gains of productivity related to the introduction of new information 
technology were, traditionally, the most studied ways to maintain a mark-up despite price 
competition, Milberg (2008, p.428) puts forward a third source: the effective management of 
global value chains more related to cost management rather than price setting. 
The rise in cost mark-ups and profitability was achieved by focusing in some activities considered 
core or strategic (development and design, trans-divisional research, technology and business 
intelligence) while dropping the non-core activities, usually with low value creation (Gereffi et al., 
2005; Lee & Gereffi, 2015; Schwörer, 2013; Serfati, 2008)4. According to Milberg and Winkler 
(2013), thanks to the availability of various suppliers all over the world, offshore production took 
the form of arm´s-length relationships between the leading firm and supplier establishing an 
asymmetric market structure which consists of a monopsonic buyer relation between those 
various suppliers and the lead firms, who also exercise oligopoly power as sellers.  
The benefits associated with offshoring are well documented for different countries and 
industries. Jabbour (2010) uses information on offshoring activity by French manufacturing firms 
for the year 1999 and finds positive effects on profitability and productivity. Milberg and Winkler 
(2009) show that services and materials’ offshoring significantly increased profit shares between 
1998 and 2006 in the USA. For Irish electronics firms, Görg and Hanley (2004) find that 
international outsourcing improves the profitability of large companies. Dunn et al (2009) report, 
for the U.S. technology sector case between 2001 and 2005, that firms offshoring technology-
oriented jobs have greater earnings and operating cash flows. D’Attoma and Pacei (2014) also find 
positive effects for the Italian manufacturing industry. In a survey carried by the McKinsey Global 
Institute (2003) cited in Milberg and Winkler (2013), it is mentioned that the cost saving of 
offshoring is between 45% to 55%. 
As Baud and Durand (2012) pointed out, suppliers are not only forced to compete among each 
other but also must face leader firm’s terms of payments, its standards of just-in-time production, 
as well as carry the risks associated with sales volatility, which imposes additional financial costs 
 
3 Although greater flexibility and diversification of location are also important. 
4 This distinction between core and non-core activities is based on the competencies of a firm, rather than 
its products (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). However, we will follow a different perspective related to the 
industry-level data we will use: core (non-core) offshoring of a given industry is defined by the import of 
inputs that belongs to the same (a different) two-digit Standard Industrial Classification industry (e.g. 
Feenstra and Hanson, 1999). The underlying assumption is that core tangible and intangible assets of a 
corporation are probably related to its primary industry. We rely on this definition in this article (for more 
details see section 3.2). 
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and increase their capital needs. This lack of accountability for standards in the supplying firm, be 
they working standards or capital commitments, is one of the most important differences between 
arm’s-length relations and in-house offshoring through vertical foreign direct investment (FDI) 
according to Milberg & Winkler (2013). In fact, they argue that the asymmetry between leading 
firms and suppliers created conditions for greater returns from externalization than 
internalization. Internalization through FDI is preferred in those cases where a strategic protection 
of an asset, such as a knowledge asset, is involved or when the objective is to replicate productive 
capacity in a foreign location, also known as “market-seeking” or horizontal FDI. The authors show 
the relative increase of horizontal FDI compared to vertical going from 25.4% in 1985 to 63.8% in 
2010 (Milberg & Winkler, 2013, p. 133, Table 4.8). Figure 3 indicates the growing importance of 
U.S. FDI outward flows relative to U.S. investment, and the increase in the stock of FDI measured 
as percentage of GDP. Nevertheless, it confirms the fact that most of that FDI is related to 
horizontal rather than vertical FDI considering that approximately 70% is maintained in developed 
countries.  
[Figure 3. Stock and Flow of U.S. Outward FDI, 1985-2012]  
Besides the effects on profits, we are interested in studying how these recent changes affected 
investment. Milberg and Winkler (2013, p. 224) identify three channels by which offshoring affects 
investment. Domestic capital stock can be diminished due to its replacement by foreign capital, 
the ‘substitution effect’, or due to a reduced demand for capital for each unit of output produced, 
the ‘capital productivity’ effect. However, it can also increase due to the growth in the scale of 
production, the ‘scale effect’5. Their results show that between 1996 and 2006 offshoring 
significantly reduced capital accumulation.  
2.3. The codependence between the financialisation of NFC and 
offshoring 
In the previous sections we have shown, separately, the decrease in investment, the increase in 
financial payouts and offshoring in the USA. Milberg’s (2008) pioneering work first indicated the 
relation among these different phenomenon: since firms own less productive facilities due to 
offshoring, profits are not reinvested in inputs, plants and equipment, but redirected to the 
purchase of financial assets and dividend payments which raises shareholder value. Milberg and 
Winkler (2013, p. 230) later showed, for different U.S. sectors between 1998 and 2006, that 
services offshoring increases financialisation in the USA. For different countries and industries, 
 
5 Moser et al. (2015) identifies similar channels by which offshoring affects another outcome variable as 
employment. 
  9  
 
Durand and Miroudot (2015) introduce financialisation, in addition to offshoring, as a possible 
explanation of the level of employment. Their results suggest that these two variables are 
significantly correlated with employment, though their effects are unrelated in their macro 
dataset. 
Other studies have been carried for specific sectors and results go in the same direction. Soener 
(2015) analyses the apparel and footwear industry, differentiating among branded manufactures 
(firms that own some productive facilities as well as their own brand), branded marketers (firms 
that contract all production and sell their brands in retailers), general retailers (which sell their 
own products and others as well), special retailers (which sell their own products) and textile 
assemblers and producers (firms that do not fit previously mentioned categories). His empirical 
results support the hypothesis that the more a firm divests from production, the more likely it will 
be financialised: branded marketers have around 700% the level of financial assets, 300% the level 
of payouts and 430% the level of interest income compared with general retailers. Branded 
marketers have 222% the level of assets and 194% the level of payouts compared with general 
retailers. Baud and Durand (2012) show, for the retail sector, that the development of 
international and financial operations contributed to its ability to provide high returns to 
shareholders. 
Relying on the literature previously reviewed, we propose a framework in Figure 4 based on the 
channels by which offshoring affects employment (Moser, Urban, & Weder Di Mauro, 2015) and 
investment (Milberg & Winkler, 2013). Nevertheless, since we focus on the microeconomic level of 
the firm, and because we work with world-consolidated firm-level data, this framework focuses on 
the firms’ perspective rather than on the home nation’s viewpoint. Basically, we assume that 
offshoring is profitable to the firm but the use of profits will depend on the organisational set-up 
of offshoring. Five relationships between offshoring, investment and payout can be drawn. 
1) If we acknowledge that core-offhoring of production tends to be internalized in order to protect 
strategic assets, and even if it may reduce domestic investment by a substitution or a productivity 
effect, it would increase firm’s investment through FDI and also thanks to a growth in the scale of 
production6. Here the payout policy may go in two directions: either the firm may reduce payout 
to focus on foreign investment, or the new source of profit is enough to increase both investment 
and payout. 
 
6 There is abundant literature on the effects of FDI over investment. While market-seeking FDI generally has 
a positive effect on domestic investment, which is in line with the scale effect hypothesis, cost-seeking FDI 
tends to be negative. See for example Lian and Chuang, (2007); Hering et al., (2010); Hejazi and Pauly, (2003) 
and Onaran et al., (2013). 
  10  
 
2) Conversely, non-core offshoring should result in the development of arm’s-length relationships 
between the firm and international suppliers with one major consequence being a reduction of 
investment at the world-firm level. In this case, the new source of profits can be used for 
distribution to shareholders, and a non-ambiguous negative relationship should exist between 
offshoring and investment on the one hand, and between investment and payout on the other 
hand. 
3) However, even outsourcing in non-core activities may result in an increase of investment if the 
firm reinvests its profits in capital related to its core competences, especially when the firm enjoys 
a scale effect. This case ends as in case number 1; it is uncertain that profits will be distributed to 
shareholders if they are oriented toward core investment. Given that one of the main business 
models adopted by U.S. firms combines financialisation and offshoring (Lazonick, 2009; Milberg, 
2008) we hypothesize that case 2 should be more frequent than case 3. 
4) Finally, if offshoring consists of replacing a supplier in the home nation by a supplier abroad, 
then the consequences should be neutral for the firm’s investment since it already relies on 
outsourced production. Because the demand for capital is low for these firms, their profits can be 
used for distribution to shareholders. 
5) Of course, we cannot exclude that some firms outsource core activities while other keep non-
core ones, which results in various outcomes in investment and payouts. Nevertheless, given the 
already cited literature, these cases should not be dominant. 
[Figure 4. Offshoring, investment, and financial payouts from the firm’s perspective] 
Our main proposition is that non-core offshoring may explain the prevalence of firms with low 
investment and high financial payouts. To illustrate this statement, Figure 5 portrays trends in 
both offshoring and payout-to-investment ratios for firms belonging to different industries7. Those 
related to the production of machinery, nondurables and durables goods present the highest rates 
of offshoring along with the highest payout-to-investment ratios. Here, two caveats must be 
noted. First, most industries have increased their financial payouts relative to investment during 
the 2000’s. A closer look to the data shows that most of the increase occurs after 2007. When 
profits and stock prices decline, paying dividends and stocks buybacks are a good way to retain 
shareholders. We are therefore attentive to the persistence of the relationship we presume 
 
7 Figure 5 provides the median and the 75th percentile of the payout-to-investment ratio by industry because 
the mean is distorted by extreme values in some industries. Table 3 provides detailed descriptive statistics of 
the mean, the median, and the75th percentile of the payout-to-investment ratio for the 31 industries we 
study. 
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between offshoring and financialisation over time. Second, two industries with low offshoring also 
present high payout-to-investment ratios (utilities, ISIC E, and wholesale and retail trade, ISIC 51 
and 52). We also consider the possible non-linearity between offshoring and financialisation that 
can be perceived in Figure 5 and Table 3. However, two remarks can be made here in order to 
sustain our statement. 
[Figure 5. Non-core offshoring and payout-to-investment ratio] 
[Table 3. Industries’ non-core non-energy offshoring and financial payout-to-investment ratios] 
First, it should be noted that utilities are usually excluded in corporate finance studies that focus 
either on dividend policy (Fama & French, 2001) or accumulation slowdown (Asker, Farre-Mensa, 
& Ljungqvist, 2014). The rationale is that dividend or investment in those firms may be a by-
product of federal or state regulation. Utilities are still regulated, and even after the sector’s 
deregulation initiated by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, they continue to pay high dividends 
(D’Souza, Jacob, & Willis, 2015). Second, the wholesale and retail trade industries reach the same 
median or 75th percentile in the payout-to-investment ratio than the industries with high 
offshoring, especially in the second half of the 2000's. We have to underline that our measure of 
offshoring, i.e. the share of foreign input in total output, doesn’t capture the offshoring of firms 
belonging to these industries because they import final products rather than intermediary 
products. Actually, these firms rely heavily on offshoring (Baud & Durand, 2012; Chesnais, 2016; 
Gereffi, 1994; Milberg & Winkler, 2013) and are mainly those that fall in the case number 4 in the 
Figure 4. Nevertheless, our general results are not affected by the presence of utilities and 
wholesale and retail trade industries.  
3. The regression specification 
3.1. The baseline model: financialisation of NFCs 
Because we want to assess to what extent financialisation and offshoring are related phenomenon 
in the accumulation slowdown, we rely on the investment function discussed in section 2.1, 
primarily based on Fazzari et al. (1988) who criticize the Modigliani-Miller principle of capital 
structure irrelevance. For this principle, investment decisions are independent of financial factors, 
being just relative factor prices that drive investment. On the contrary, Fazzari et al. (1988) show 
the importance of financing constraints and, particularly, the internal cash flow for investment 
decisions. The significance of internal funds is also supported by Hubbard (1997) and Brown et al 
(2009). 
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Acknowledging the changes in contemporary economies brought about by financialisation, a group 
of scholars has tried to re-estimate those investment functions, explicitly considering different 
financial determinants (Hecht, 2014; Orhangazi, 2008). Our baseline model basically follows their 
work and is defined in the following way: 𝐼𝐾 = 𝑓(𝐼𝑡−1𝐾 , 𝜋𝐾 , 𝑆𝐾 , 𝑄, 𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐾 , 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐾 , 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐾 , 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐾 , 𝑆𝑇𝐾𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝐾 , 𝑆𝑇𝐾𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐾 ,𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝐾 ,     𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐹𝐾 ) 
I is capital expenditure; K is net property, plant and equipment; π is operating income; S is sales; Q 
is Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of firms’ market capitalisation and book liabilities over total assets 
; LONGDEBT is long debt; INTEXP is interest expense; INTINC is interest and investment income; 
DIV are the common and preferred stock dividends paid; STKISSUE and STKREP are the issuance 
and repurchase of common and preferred stock, respectively; NETDEBTISSUE is the difference 
between the sale and purchase of short-term and long-term debt; INTERNF is firm’s balance sheet 
value of cash and short-term securities, and it is used as a proxy of internal cash flow, following 
Hecht (2014). Compustat data items corresponding to each of these variables can be found in the 
appendix (Table A1), along with description of variables used in Figures and other Tables. 
As it is standard in this literature we take lags of explanatory variables. In Post Keynesian theories 
of the firm, investment decisions are indeed modelled as a function of expected profits (Dallery, 
2009; Lavoie, 2014). In a context of fundamental uncertainty as meant by Keynes (1937), where it 
is not possible to know future values of demand and profits, it is reasonable to think that previous 
experience serves as a basis for expectations. According to Davis (2017), this experience may be 
captured by past values of independent variables because all flow variables in year t are not 
necessarily realized when the decision of investment is taken, while the flows occurring during the 
year t-1 are well-known and may explain the decision to invest. 
Besides the importance of internal funds (
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐹𝐾 ) and profits (𝜋𝐾) as a source of capital spending, 
which should be positively correlated with investment (Fazzari et al., (1988), our model also 
captures the dynamic nature of investment and its path-dependency (Kalecki, 1954): positive signs 
for past investment (
𝐼𝑡−1𝐾 ) reflect the dynamic process it involves. Sales (𝑆𝐾), along with profits (𝜋𝐾), 
are frequent variables in investment functions (Chirinko, 1993) and reflect the firm’s growth 
opportunities. In a Keynesian perspective, sales represent the microeconomic demand for the 
firm’s products. Sales may be also a proxy for the growth in the scale of production (Milberg & 
Winkler, 2013, p. 224) described in section 2.2. For all these reasons, sales should be positively 
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correlated with investment. Tobin’s q (𝑄) is also a standard variable (Chirinko, 1993) and is a proxy 
for profit and investment expectations and as such should be positively correlated with 
investment. 
As explained in section 2.1., interest income (
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐾 ) measures the extent by which real 
investment is displaced by financial investment and should be negatively correlated with 
investment, even though previous results in the literature are mitigated because, as Orhangazi 
(2008) explained, financial income can also be used to fund investment. Interest expenditures 
(
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐾 ), dividends (𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐾 ), and stock repurchases (𝑆𝑇𝐾𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐾 ) align with the story of real investment 
being displaced by financial payments; we expect negative sign for all of them, as the literature 
usually finds. We expect a negative sign for long-term debt (
𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐾 ) as a consequence of the 
financial fragility of the firm, but we acknowledge that debt may have a positive effect as a source 
of funds for investment8. For net debt issue (
𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝐾 ), we expect a positive sign based on its 
role in financing real investment, highlighted by Kliman and Williams (2014). The same applies for 
stock issue (
𝑆𝑇𝐾𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝐾 ) as stressed by Hecht (2014). 
To sum up, expected signs are: 
( 𝐼𝐾)𝐼𝑡−1𝐾 > 0, ( 𝐼𝐾)𝜋𝐾 > 0, ( 𝐼𝐾)𝑆𝐾 > 0, ( 𝐼𝐾)𝑄 > 0, ( 𝐼𝐾)𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐾 ≷ 0, ( 𝐼𝐾)𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐾 < 0, ( 𝐼𝐾)𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐾 ≷ 0 , ( 𝐼𝐾)𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐾 < 0, ( 𝐼𝐾)𝑆𝑇𝐾𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝐾 >  0, ( 𝐼𝐾)𝑆𝑇𝐾𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐾 <  0, ( 𝐼𝐾)𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝐾 >  0, ( 𝐼𝐾)𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐹𝐾 > 0 
The statistical specification will be the following: 
ln ( 𝐼𝐾)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ln ( 𝐼𝐾)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 ln (𝜋𝐾)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3 ln (𝑆𝐾)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4 ln(𝑄)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼5 ln (𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐾 )𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛼6 ln (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐾 )𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼7 ln (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐾 )𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼8 ln (𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐾 )𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼9 ln (𝑆𝑇𝐾𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝐾 )𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛼10 ln (𝑆𝑇𝐾𝑅𝐸𝑃𝐾 )𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼11 ln (𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝐾 )𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼12 ln (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐹𝐾 )𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡+ ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑡=2011𝑡=1996 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            (1) 
 
8 We use the contemporaneous value as it is done by Hecht (2014) and Schoder (2014) to take into account 
the current financial fragility of the firm. 
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where ln is a logarithmic function used to account for potential non-linearities between explained 
and explanatory variables9, α0... α12 are parameters, the i subscript denotes the firm and the t 
subscript denotes the time period. 𝛾𝑖𝑡 is the coefficient of the age of the corporation.  𝛽𝑡 are 
coefficients of a set of time dummies, while 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents nonobservable shocks. The regression 
variables are divided by capital stock to correct for heteroscedasticity and control for firm size. It is 
important to control for the age and the size of the corporation because small and recently listed 
firms usually don’t pay dividends (Fama & French, 2001) and do investment thanks to the cash 
they raise on the stock exchange (Lazonick, 2009). We will estimate equation (1) for the complete 
sample and for the subsamples of large and small firms, taking into account the findings of 
Orhangazi (2008), Davis (2017) and Tori and Onaran (2018) who found larger effects of 
financialisation-related variables for the former. 
3.2. The main hypothesis: the financialisation-offshoring nexus 
Once we estimate this baseline model, we will concentrate on the specific novelty we are dealing 
with: an analysis of the simultaneous effects of financialisation and offshoring in investment 
functions using industry-level information from WIOD. In accordance with our framework (section 
2.3, Figure 4), we include two measures for offshoring: one for the narrow or core activities of the 
enterprise considered are those inputs from the same sector (COREOFF) and another for the non-
core and non-energy activities calculated as those inputs from the other sectors excluding energy 
(NONCORENONENERGYOFF), as proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999). To limit the effects of 
domestic outsourcing as much as possible, we take the total output of each sector as the 
denominator (Geishecker, 2007)10. The measures are the following: 
𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑗 = 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝐹𝑌𝑗 , 
𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐺𝑌𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑗 = ∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑘𝐹𝑘≠𝑗𝑌𝑗 , 
where IIF is foreign intermediary inputs, Y total output, and subscripts j and k denote two-digit ISIC 
(International Standard Industrial Classification) industry. Including offshoring gives the following 
equation: 
 
9 Our log transformation avoids censorship of firms with variables equal or inferior to zero (those with 
negative earnings or without stock issues or financial payouts for example): for any variable var, we 
compute ln(var) = -ln(var + 1) if var≤0, and ln(var) = ln(var+1) if var>0. 
10 It could also be used, in the denominator, industry’s total inputs (Amiti & Wei, 2005) or industry value 
added (Hijzen, Görg, & Hine, 2005). However, as Geishecker (2007) notes, those two measures are less 
accurate than the one with total output in the denominator since they are both affected by domestic 
outsourcing. We will focus on this last measure in the next sections. 
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ln ( 𝐼𝐾)𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ⋯ + 𝛼13 ln(𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹)𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛼14 ln(𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐺𝑌𝑂𝐹𝐹)𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑡=2011𝑡=1996+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (2) 
Here, one point is worth mentioning on the significance and the sign of coefficients α13 and α14. 
Our measures are not able to distinguish between the production offshored to affiliates and that 
to other enterprises like we did in Figure 4. A negative sign would be related to the substitution of 
the firm’s own production through downsizing, while a positive sign would be linked to the 
potential increase in their domestic and foreign market share due to the increase in the scale of 
production. However, considering that a large proportion of the downsize movement has been 
concentrated in non-core activities and the benefits associated to arm-length subcontracting 
(Milberg & Winkler, 2013), we should expect that NONCORENONENERGYOFF is negatively 
correlated with investment (α14<0, see case number 2 in section 2.3 and Figure 4). Conversely, in 
the case of offshoring core activities, we acknowledge that firms may prefer to keep and refocus 
on their core competences (Lee & Gereffi, 2015). Therefore, if they offshore them, we make the 
assumption that it would be to a subsidiary (although our scheme recognizes with a dotted line, as 
it happens in reality, that it could be to a non-affiliated). Hence, COREOFF should be positively 
correlated with investment (α13>0). In case of a positive sign, however, we would not be able to 
determine whether it is related to the transfer of production to a subsidiary or to a scale effect 
(see case number 1 in section 2.3 and Figure 4).  
We now turn to our main proposition regarding the co-dependence of financialisation and 
offshoring. We know that the distribution of cash to the financial sector, and especially to 
shareholders through dividends and share buybacks, is partly at the expense of capital 
accumulation of U.S. NFCs (see Section 2.1)11. This means that they distribute an increasing share 
of their earnings rather than retaining and investing them. Nevertheless, pursuing an intensive 
payout policy requires not only to reduce the share of investment but also to maintain profits. As 
we say in the introduction, one way to do so has been the involvement in GVCs.  
Consequently, we hypothesize that the negative correlation between payouts and investment has 
been possible for firms belonging to industries highly involved in GVCs which decreased their need 
for own productive facilities through arm-length relations. This hypothesis will be true if financial 
payouts are significantly negatively correlated with investment in capital expenditures for the 
subsample of firms belonging to industry consuming the highest level of foreign non-core 
intermediary inputs, and if the correlation is non-significant for the subsample of firms belonging 
 
11 We will test again this assertion thanks to equations (1) and (2). 
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to industry with low offshoring. To implement the test related to this hypothesis, we split the 
sample according to the upper and lower year-median in NONCORENONENERGYOFF since 
offshoring in non-core activities is assumed to be the main source of decreasing investment and 
therefore the background of the downsize and distribute strategy (see Figure 5). Table 3 presents 
the distribution of offshoring according to the various industries in our sample. 
4. Data and estimation methodology 
We took our data from the Standard and Poors’ Compustat Annual Industrial Database and the 
updated WIOD for the United States. The latter is organized following the ISIC 3rd revision, which is 
not available in Standard and Poors, so we use the SIC codes of each firm. The correspondence 
between the two classifications was based on the concordance tables provided by the U.S. census 
bureau. 
We use information from all active and inactive, publicly listed nonfinancial U.S. corporations12, 
excluding financial firms identified by the primary SIC codes from 6000 to 6799, firms without 
sectoral information, and firms whose exchange ticker is over the counter. We use annual data 
from 1995-2011, the period during which WIOD information is available. 
Although Standard and Poors provides standardized information, we found that many firms have 
no information on several variables used in this paper. Thus, apart from removing the enterprises 
mentioned in the last paragraph, we removed firms with no information for all years of capital 
expenditure, sales, net property plant and equipment, long-term debt, interest expenses, of cash 
and short-term securities, total assets, total liabilities, and equities. We also removed observations 
with no information on market capitalization at the end of the year, with duplicate observations, 
negative values for interest income, and positive values for interest expenses and dividends. 
Finally, to account for outliers, we winsorize observations at the upper and lower 0.5%13. The final 
sample includes on average 2,049 companies by year, representing 68% of the total U.S. market 
capitalization14. Tables 4 and 5 display the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for all 
the variables we are using. Descriptive statistics on offshoring and financial payout-to-investment 
ratios are also provided for each of the 31 sectors of our sample in Table 3. 
 
12 These companies are incorporated and have their headquarters in the United States and their primary 
listing in a U.S. stock market. 
13 Values of each variable are set either at the 0.5 or 99.5 percentile value when they are respectively lower 
or higher than these thresholds. 
14 This ratio compares the market capitalization of the U.S. non-financial corporations of our sample to the 
total market capitalization disclosed in the World Bank statistics, which also include financial corporations 
and foreign corporations with primary listing in the United States. 
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[Table 4: Descriptive Statistics] 
[Table 5: Correlation Matrix] 
By considering a panel data with the lagged value of investment as an explanatory variable, we 
introduce two different sources of persistence over time: autocorrelation due to the lagged 
dependent variable among regressors and individual persistent effects (Baltagi, 2008, p. 135). A 
fixed effects estimator, although wiping out the individual effects, is unable to eliminate the 
correlation between the lagged variable and the error term. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) proposed 
first differencing the model in order to remove the individual effects and then using the second lag 
of the dependent variable as an instrument for the first lag which would not be correlated with the 
error as long as it is not serially correlated. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure that is 
more efficient than the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) estimator. The procedure (also called 
difference GMM) uses additional instruments based on the orthogonality condition that exists 
between lagged values of the dependent variable and the error term and also other possible 
strictly exogenous regressors15. The estimator has one-step and two-step variants, the finite-
sample correction derived by Windmeijer (2005) can make the two-step more efficient than one-
step. Based on this, we will use the Arellano-Bond two-step difference GMM estimator, which is 
also the mostly used in the literature we summarised in section 2.1. Roodman (2009b) points out 
that this estimator is especially useful for situations with “small T, large N” panels, linear functional 
relationships, one left-hand variable that is dynamic, independent variables that are not strictly 
exogenous, fixed individual effects, and, finally, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within 
individuals but not across them. 
Different tests are implemented. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation is applied to the first-
difference equation residuals in order to detect unobserved and perfectly autocorrelated 
instrumental variables. While an AR(1) is expected in first differences (ar1p in the tables), a higher-
order autocorrelation (in our case, only second order: ar2p in the tables) shows that some lags of 
the dependent variables used as instruments are endogenous. We will also report a test for over-
identifying restrictions: Hansen J statistic. This statistic is the minimized value of the two-step 
GMM criterion function and it is robust to heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation. 
 
15 Apart from the difference version there is also the system GMM, developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), 
that is useful for situations in which the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is close to unity, which 
is not our case. 
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Finally, difference GMM can generate quite a great number of instruments, something that, 
although does not compromise consistency, can move it away from the asymptotic ideal. In fact, 
according to Roodman (2009a, p. 7), “[t]he absence of formal tests and accepted rules of thumb 
makes it important for researchers to test GMM results for robustness to reductions in the 
instrument set”. Therefore, as robustness test, we both collapse the number of instruments and 
drop non-significant variables. 
5. Estimation results 
Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of equations (1) and (2) for all, as well as large and 
small firms defined as the upper and lower year-median in total assets, respectively. It also shows 
results of equation (2) for enterprises with high and low levels of offshoring (defined by the year-
median of the sample). 
[Table 6. Estimation results based on equations (1) and (2). Period: 1995-2011]  
Results from equation (1) are presented under the heading “Financialisation model” in Table 6. 
Regarding the financial payout channel, dividends have a negative and statistically significant 
elasticity of 0.05. Stock repurchases also present a negative elasticity but lower, 0.009, and non-
significant. Considering that financial payouts (the sum of interest expense, dividends and stock 
repurchases) have a negative elasticity of 0.036 in Orhangazi (2008) and that, in the case of Hecht 
(2014) dividends present a negative and significant elasticity of 0.02 and net stock issuance 
presents a positive but non-significant value of 0.012, our results are in line with the literature. As 
in the case of Orhangazi (2008), large firms also present a stronger correlation in our estimations: 
stock repurchases become statistically significant only for them with an elasticity of -0.016. 
Regarding the financial income channel, we find positive but non-significant effects in all cases. 
Orhangazi and Hecht also found positive and non-significant effects for this variable. As we 
indicated in section 2.1, results for financial income tend to be less robust in the literature 
compared to financial payouts. Moreover, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of 
INTERNALF at the 1% level. This result not only proves the importance of internal funds for 
investment decisions but may also explain why Davis (2017) obtains positive and statistically 
significant results for her measures of financial assets. Our variable INTERNALF is analogous to 
Davis’ measure of ‘cash and short-term investments’. Therefore, contrary to the crowding out 
thesis, some financial assets are in fact positively correlated with real accumulation.   
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In the case of control variables, all other variables but LONGDEBT and INTEXP are significant with 
the expected sign. Net debt issue, stock issue, tobin's q, sales, profits, and past investment are all 
positive and significant for the whole sample and for large and small firms. 
Table 6 also shows results when COREOFF and NONCORENONENERGYOFF are introduced. In the 
case of the new variables, NONCORENONENERGYOFF has a negative and significant elasticity of 
0.039 for all non-financial firms. For all non-financial firms, COREOFF has a positive sign as 
expected, with a significant elasticity of 0.026. We have to stress that we are only able to say that 
firms that belong to industries with high (low) non-core offshoring are firms that invest less (more) 
than the other ones. We are not able to disentangle if the positive effect of COREOFF is due to a 
tendency to offshore in foreign affiliates or to a scale effect that stimulates domestic investment. 
Similarly, we are not be able to determine whether the negative sign of NONCORENONENERGYOFF 
is related to a substitution effect or to a capital productivity effect, i.e. a reduced demand for 
capital for each unit of output produced. Nevertheless, our results are in line with the framework 
of section 2.3 and support the idea that firms in industry with a high level of offshoring in non-core 
activities can have a lower demand for capital since part of their production is probably 
outsourced. In all the cases, control variables from equation (1) maintain sign, significance, and 
similar values. Nevertheless dividends are no longer significant while stock repurchases are still 
negative and significant for the largest firms. 
Finally, if we turn to the comparison between high and low non-core non-energy offshoring 
sectors, we find supporting evidence for our main hypothesis. Regarding the financial payout 
channel of financialisation, we find that dividends are significant for firms in high non-core non-
energy offshoring sectors, both for the full sample and the subsamples of large and small firms in 
high non-core non-energy offshoring industries. Moreover, the negative elasticities, between -0.1 
and -0.08, are higher than in the financialisation model: firms belonging to high non-core non-
energy offshoring sectors have an elasticity for dividends which is 60% higher than when we make 
no distinction in terms of sectors in the financialisation model. Stock repurchases are also negative 
and significant for the full sample of firms in high non-core non-energy offshoring sectors, also 
with an elasticity that is around 60% higher than when we make no distinction in terms of sectors 
in the financialisation model (although it’s not significant for the latter). The rate of accumulation 
would have been 8% higher without the rise in dividends for firms belonging to high offshoring 
sectors. All in all, this shows the relevant economic effect played by offshoring for the 
financialisation of NFCs. Combining a weak demand for capital and a strong supply of financial 
payouts has been possible for firms belonging to industries in which the offshoring of the non-core 
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production provides opportunities to outsource productive facilities. On the other hand, for low 
non-core non-energy offshoring sectors neither dividends nor stock repurchases present a 
negative and statistically significant relation with investment.  
As far as the financial income channel of financialisation is concerned, it is worth noting that 
interest income becomes statistically significant and positive for the whole sample of firms with a 
high level of offshoring in non-core non-energy sectors. Contrary to the thesis of the crowding out 
of real investment by financial investment, financial income is probably a source of funding for this 
subsample. Both in the empirical literature and in our results it seems that neither financial assets 
nor financial income can support the financial crowding out thesis.  
6. Robustness check 
Next, we address potential shortcomings of the above estimates, especially the persistence over 
time and the potential non-linearity between offshoring and financialisation. In the previous 
estimates, we had controlled for year fixed effects, and our log transformation of each variable 
may already account for potential non-linearities between explained and explanatory variables. 
Nevertheless, as suggested by the descriptive statistics in section 2.3, we delve deeper into these 
issues. We also conduct other traditional robustness tests, as mentioned in section 4.  
We first split the sample into two sub-periods, 1995-2002 and 2003-2011, the last period 
corresponding to the phase with an increase in offshoring as shown by Figure 1. Results in Table 7 
hold for both sub-periods although they seem to be stronger in the first period with negative and 
significant effects of dividends and stock repurchases, while only dividends are significant in 2003-
2011. Our conclusion remains valid even if results weaken in the second period, probably because 
all industries have increased their financial payouts in the mid-2000’s, and especially in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis as explained in section 2.3. 
[Table 7. Estimation results based on equation (2). Periods: 1995-2002 and 2003-2011] 
We now address the issue of the non-linearity between offshoring and financialisation that can be 
perceived in Figure 5 and Table 3 (section 2.3). Our main proposition relies on a test that splits the 
sample between firms belonging to high or low non-core non-energy offshoring industries. We 
examine the validity of our proposition when we split the sample in four quartiles. Table 8 shows 
that both the top 25% and the top 75%-50% in non-core non-energy offshoring sectors present a 
significant negative correlation between investment and either dividends or stock repurchases. For 
the bottom 50%-25%, dividends and stock repurchases are no longer significant. Nevertheless, the 
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bottom 25% presents a negative and significant correlation between stock repurchases and 
investment for the sub-sample of large firms. As we explained in section 2.3., this result is 
probably due to the utilities industry and to the wholesale and retail trade sectors. Table 8 also 
shows the results for the bottom 25% when we remove from the sample utilities and wholesale 
and retail trade sectors: neither stock repurchases nor dividends are significant16. Utilities have 
indeed a dividend and investment policy very specific, due to the regulation in this industry, and 
that is why standard studies in corporate finance usually exclude this sector, -e.g. Fama & French 
(2001) for the dividend policy and Asker, Farre-Mensa, & Ljungqvist (2014) for the accumulation 
slowdown. Regarding the wholesale and retail trade sectors it is important to stress again that 
they import mainly final products while our indicator NONCORENONENERGYOFF is a measure of 
the share of foreign input in total output, which therefore minimizes the involvement of wholesale 
and retail trade in offshoring. If results in Table 8 lead to moderate the scope of our statement, 
they don’t undermine our main conclusion because large firms in wholesale and retail trade 
sectors have organised the so-called ‘buyer-driven global commodity chains’ in which they have 
both monopsony and monopoly power (Baud & Durand, 2012; Chesnais, 2016 , chapters 4 and 6; 
Gereffi, 1994; Milberg & Winkler, 2013). They are therefore also highly involved in the offshoring 
of production but not the offshoring we are capturing with our indicator. As a result, these firms 
can have a lower demand for capital and a higher payout policy.  
[Table 8. Estimation results based on equation (2), different quartiles of non-core non-energy 
offshoring. Period: 1995-2011] 
In the Appendix we present additional robustness checks. In Table A2 we reduce the number of 
instruments, in Table A3 we drop nonsignificant variables (LONGDEBT, INTEXP and INTINC), and 
we consider the upper and lower 25% in terms of size in Table A4, rather than the median. 
Through all estimations, the financialisation model (equation 1) and the financialisation and 
offshoring model (equation 2) provide six specifications to assess the robustness of our results for 
the whole sample (Tables 6, A2, and A3), and they provide eight specifications for the sample of 
large firms when adding Table A4. The negative effect of stock repurchases for large firms is a 
robust result because it is significant in eight cases out of eight. Nevertheless, the negative 
correlation of dividends for the whole sample is significant in four cases out of six and cannot be 
considered as robust. Regarding the offshoring-related variables in equation (2) for the whole 
sample (Tables 6, A2, and A3), NONCORENONENERGYOFF is significant in two cases out of three 
and COREOFF is significant in one case out of three. As we said in the introduction, the positive 
 
16 Stock repurchases remain significant if we remove only one of these sectors. 
  22  
 
and negative elasticities of COREOFF and NONCORENONENERGYOFF in Table 6 are in line with the 
literature but those effects are not clear-cut through all specifications. However, results for the 
financialisation-offshoring nexus are robust. 
Concerning the interaction between financialisation and offshoring, equation (2) is estimated five 
times in tables 6, 7 (for two periods), A2, and A3 for the whole sample of firms in high offshoring 
sectors and, with Table A4, six times for the sample of large firms in high offshoring sectors: for the 
whole sample, the negative elasticities of dividends are significant in five cases out of five, and 
stock repurchases are significant in four cases out of five (non-significant for the 2003-2011 period 
only). If we consider also the top two quartiles of offshoring in Table 8, elasticities of dividends are 
negative and significant in six cases out of seven, and elasticities of stock repurchases are negative 
and significant in five cases out of seven. But in each of the seven cases, either dividends or stock 
repurchases are significant. For large firms, however, results are less robust: stock repurchases and 
dividends are each significant in two cases out of six only (or 2/8 with Table 8). Overall, our results 
give evidence that financialisation on average does not occur for firms belonging to industries with 
low non-core non-energy offshoring while it compromises capital accumulation of firms belonging 
to the industries most involved in GVCs. 
7. Conclusion 
As two of the major forces shaping world economic dynamics over the last several decades, 
financialisation and globalisation have deservedly received a good deal of academic scrutiny. 
Among the various ways in which the term financialisation is used, we concentrated on the 
financialisation of NFCs. One of the ways in which financialisation affects them is by displacing 
investment with different financial payments such as interest expenditures, dividends, and share 
buybacks. However, the literature on financialisation has not profoundly analysed how such a 
situation could be sustained over 30 years. In this paper we explored the financialisation-
offshoring nexus as a possible answer and found promising results. 
Starting from a baseline model derived from Orhangazi (2008) and Hecht (2014), we conducted an 
econometric regression to show the consequences of both financialisation and offshoring on U.S. 
NFCs’ investment between 1995 and 2011. We built two offshoring variables, one for core and 
other for non-core non-energy activities, based on industry-level information that show the effect 
of transferring production outside the United States. We estimated equations for the entire 
sample and for subsamples of large and small firms belonging to high and low non-core non-
energy offshoring sectors. In line with previous literature, financialisation is especially apparent 
  23  
 
amongst the largest firms. Offshoring in non-core non-energy activities tends to have a negative 
effect on investment for all firms. This result supports the idea that enterprises are likely to 
subcontract to other foreign firms’ non-core activities. 
The interaction between the financialisation of NFCs and offshoring was studied by splitting the 
sample between high and low non-core non-energy offshoring sectors considering that arm-length 
relations tend to be focused in these types of activities. Our results confirm the nexus as the 
financial payouts variables were significant for firms belonging to industries with the highest level 
of offshoring only. For corporations that distribute financial payouts at the expense of their capital 
accumulation, the real source of the cash distributed to shareholders should be found in GVCs. 
Although our econometric analysis ends in 2011, the patterns described in this paper in terms of 
payouts, investment, and offshoring have remained until these days. Even intangible intensive 
firms, like Apple, have engaged in important stock buybacks17. This seems to run counter to those 
who claim that the platform economy is characterized by patient capital. In order to explain this 
paradox, future research should address the role played by intangibles, and the different features 
associated to these assets which complement the offshoring dynamic. 
   
 
17 See Lazonick (2015), and Financial Times, May 1, 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/c0555be2-4d79-
11e8-8a8e-22951a2d8493.  
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Figures 
Figure 1. Investment as a ratio of Net Financial Payouts for the U.S. Economy and U.S. listed 
firms, and Offshoring Intensity, 1946-2016. Source: Table Z1, Financial Accounts of the USA, 
Compustat and WIOD. Authors’ calculations. 
 
Note: Offshoring Intensity is the industries’ average of all Intermediate Imported Inputs over output.  
 
Figure 2. Net financial payouts as percentage of operating surplus for the U.S. Economy and 
U.S. listed firms, 1971-2016. Source: Table Z1, Financial Accounts of the USA and Compustat. 
Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 3. Stock and Flow of U.S. Outward FDI, 1985-2012. Source: Table Z1, Financial Accounts 
of the USA; OECD, FDI statistics according to Benchmark Definition 3rd Edition (BMD3), FDI 












Note: dotted lines indicate relationships that should be less frequent than the one designated by solid lines. 
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Figure 5. Non-core offshoring and Payout-to-Investment ratio. Source: WIOD and Compustat. 
Authors’ calculations.  
 
This figure shows, over the period 1995-2011, the relationship between the mean non-core non-energy offshoring, 
i.e. the share of foreign input in total output, and either the median or the 75th percentile of the payout-to-
investment ratio, i.e. dividends and share repurchases over capital expenditures. Sectors are grouped in 10 
industries and are ranked according to the level of offshoring in bar charts. Scatter plots present the payout-to-
investment ratio in the horizontal axis and offshoring in the vertical axis for the 31 sectors of our study.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Financialisation variables in investment functions. 
Paper Period Data Financialisation Variables Effect on Investment 




Panel of U.S. 
nonfinancial firms 
(INT INC+DIV INC)/K 
Positive but non-significant for 
all and small NFC. Negative and 
significant for large NFC 
(INT+DIV+STK REP)/K 
Negative and significant for all, 
large and small NFC 
LT DEBT/K 
Negative and significant for all, 
large and small NFC 






(INT INC + DIV INC)/FA Negative and significant 
Hecht (2014) 1998 - 2008 
Panel of Chinese, 
French, German, 
British, Indian, 
Japanese and U.S. 
nonfinancial firms 
(results for the 
financialisation 
specification, for 
the whole sample 
and the USA 
subsample, varied 
results for the 
other countries) 
(STK ISSUE-STK REP)/K 
Positive but non-significant for 
the USA. Positive and 
significant for the whole 
sample.  
LT DEBT/K 
Positive but non-significant for 
the USA. Positive and 
significant for the whole 
sample.  
(INT INC+DIV INC)/K 
Negative but non-significant for 
the USA and the whole sample.  
INT/K 
Negative and significant for the 
USA and the whole sample.  
DIV/SALES 
Negative and significant for the 
USA. Positive but non-
significant for the whole 
sample.  
Schoder (2014) 1970-2007 
Panel of U.S. 
nonfinancial firms 
DEBT/A Varied results 
DIV/π 
Negative and significant for 
1971–1985, positive and non-
significant for 1986–2007  
DIV/MARKET VALUE 
Positive and significant for 
1971–1985, negative and non-
significant for 1986–2007  
(DIV+STK REP)/K 
Positive and significant for 
1971–1985 and 1986–2007  
NON OPERATING INC/π 
Positive and significant for 
1971–1985, positive and non-
significant for 1986–2007  
Sea et al (2016) 1990-2010 
Panel of Korean 
firms 
DEBT/K Negative and significant 
(DIV INC + INT INC)/K Positive and non-significant 
(DIV + INT)/K Negative and non-significant 
Davis (2017) 1971-2013 
Panel of U.S. 
nonfinancial firms 
NON OPERATING INC/FA 
Negative and non-significant 
for all firms. Positive and 
significant for large firms 
INT/DEBT 
Positive and non-significant for 
all firms. Negative and 
significant for large firms 
FA/A 
Positive and significant for all 
firms and quartiles 
DEBT/A 
Negative and significant for all 
firms and quartiles 
STK REP/EQUITY Negative and significant for all 
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and large firms 
Tori and 
Onaran (2018) 
1983 - 2013 
Panel of UK 
nonfinancial firms 
DIV/K Negative and significant 
INT/K Negative and significant 
(INT INC + DIV INC)/K 
Negative and significant. 
Positive and significant for 
lower 25 percentile 
FA/K Negative and significant 
Industry and aggregate level studies 
Stockhammer 
(2004) 




UK and USA 
(INT INC + DIV INC)/VA 
Negative but non-significant for 
France and the USA. Positive 
but non-significant for 
Germany and UK 
(INT+DIV)/VA 
Negative but non-significant for 
Germany, France and UK. 




Estimation for the 
USA 
(INT INC - INT)/K Negative and significant 




1978 - 2003 
Estimations for 
France 
(DIV+CAPITAL GAIN)/FA  Negative and significant 
∆FA/FA Negative and significant 
Onaran et al 
(2011) 
1962-2007 USA 
(INT INC + DIV INC - INT - 
DIV)/VA 
Negative and non-significant 
Tomaskovic-
Devey et al. 
(2015)1 
1970-2008 
Panel of U.S. 
nonfinancial 
industries 




Panel of European 
countries 
(INT INC + DIV INC)/GDP Positive and significant 
(INT + DIV)/VA Negative and significant 
DEBT/VA Positive and non-significant 
Note: INT = interest, DIV = dividend, INC=income, VA=gross value added, K = stock of capital (net property plant and 
equipment), STK = stock, REP= repurchase, LT = long term, FA = financial assets, A=assets, π = profit. 
 
 
Table 2. Definition of offshoring and outsourcing. Source: Contractor et al (2011). 




Value of entirely in-house 
activities in home nation 
Value of entirely in-house 





Value outsourced domestically in 
home nation 
Value outsourced contractually 
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Table 3. Industries’ non-core non-energy offshoring and financial payout-to-investment ratios. 









High Low (mean) (p50) (p75) 
25 Rubber and Plastics 458 0 458 1% 0.077 0.593 0.154 0.644 
29 Machinery, Nec 1532 0 1532 5% 0.073 0.940 0.242 0.915 
34t35 Transport Equipment 827 0 827 3% 0.069 0.557 0.099 0.541 
36t37 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 586 0 586 2% 0.060 1.181 0.406 1.357 
17t18 Textiles and Textile Products 575 0 575 2% 0.051 0.766 0.083 0.640 
F Construction 458 0 458 1% 0.047 1.148 0.067 0.626 
50 
Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor 
Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of 
Fuel 
192 0 192 1% 0.046 0.776 0.051 0.295 
15t16 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 1012 0 1012 3% 0.045 1.358 0.330 1.845 
19 Leather, Leather and Footwear 94 0 94 0% 0.036 0.529 0.160 0.508 
27t28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 1074 0 1074 4% 0.035 0.571 0.190 0.674 
21t22 
Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and 
Publishing 
838 0 838 3% 0.035 1.073 0.515 1.289 
20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 195 0 195 1% 0.034 0.381 0.072 0.379 
Sub-total 7841 0 7841 26% 0.054 0.892 0.203 0.912 
30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment 4541 0 4541 15% 0.032 0.940 0,000 0.480 
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 224 0 224 1% 0.031 0.775 0.183 0.466 
C Mining and Quarrying 1348 335 1683 6% 0.028 0.326 0.024 0.156 
61 Water Transport 55 66 121 0% 0.026 0.378 0.114 0.466 
64 Post and Telecommunications 878 640 1518 5% 0.024 0.791 0.048 0.465 
Sub-total 7046 1041 8087 26% 0.030 0.771 0.005 0.376 
23 
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear 
Fuel 
111 128 239 1% 0.024 0.502 0.362 0.749 
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products 1262 1412 2674 9% 0.023 0.922 0.067 0.909 
H Hotels and Restaurants 30 132 162 1% 0.022 1.498 0.111 0.644 
AtB 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and 
Fishing 
9 111 120 0% 0.021 0.588 0.129 0.565 
N Health and Social Work 0 819 819 3% 0.020 0.702 0,000 0.232 
60 Inland Transport 0 177 177 1% 0.019 0.592 0.242 0.822 
62 Air Transport 0 287 287 1% 0.017 0.260 0,000 0.142 
O 
Other Community, Social and Personal 
Services 
0 756 756 2% 0.016 1.244 0.070 0.519 
52 
Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles 
and Motorcycles; Repair of Household 
Goods 
0 2774 2774 9% 0.014 0.612 0.071 0.540 
Sub-total 1412 6596 8008 26% 0.019 0.786 0.061 0.626 
51 
Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, 
Except of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles 
0 1334 1334 4% 0.013 1.234 0.128 0.905 
M Education 0 132 132 0% 0.013 0.820 0.006 0.467 
E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 0 1965 1965 6% 0.012 0.461 0.306 0.518 
63 
Other Supporting and Auxiliary 
Transport Activities; Activities of Travel 
Agencies 
0 49 49 0% 0.011 0.547 0,000 0.303 
71t74 
Renting of M&Eq and Other Business 
Activities 
0 3146 3146 10% 0.009 1.215 0,000 0.697 
Sub-total 0 6626 6626 22% 0.011 0.983 0.161 0.611 
Total   16299 14263 30562 100% 0.029 0.852 0.082 0.629 
This table displays the number of observations in high and low non-core non-energy offshoring sectors over the 
1995-2011 period. It reports also the mean value of non-core non-energy offshoring by sectors, i.e. the share of 
foreign input in total output, and the mean, the median, and the 75th percentile of the payout-to-investment ratio 
by sectors. Industries are ranked by the level of offshoring. The four group of offshoring are built to be closed to 
25% of the sample for descriptive purpose. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable name & variable label 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
  
Capital expenditures overall 0.242 0.229 N =   30,562 
I/K between   0.223 n =    4,674 
  within   0.137 T-bar = 6.539 
Profits overall -0.052 4.400 N =   30,562 
π/K between   6.460 n =    4,674 
  within   2.355 T-bar = 6.539 
Sales overall 9.112 18.502 N =   30,562 
S/K between   19.519 n =    4,674 
  within   8.125 T-bar = 6.539 
Long Term Debt overall 2.110 6.002 N =   30,562 
LONGDEBT/K between   7.047 n =    4,674 
  within   3.138 T-bar = 6.539 
Interest Expenditure overall 0.253 1.191 N =   30,562 
INTEXP/K between   1.594 n =    4,674 
  within   0.690 T-bar = 6.539 
Interest and Investment Income overall 0.041 0.167 N =   30,562 
INTINC/K between   0.190 n =    4,674 
  within   0.098 T-bar = 6.539 
Dividends overall 0.036 0.101 N =   30,562 
DIV/K between   0.087 n =    4,674 
  within   0.055 T-bar = 6.539 
Stock Issue overall 0.484 2.921 N =   30,562 
STKISSUE/K between   3.499 n =    4,674 
  within   2.026 T-bar = 6.539 
Stock Repurchase overall 0.109 0.422 N =   30,562 
STKREP/K between   0.330 n =    4,674 
  within   0.311 T-bar = 6.539 
Net Debt Issue overall 0.255 2.399 N =   30,562 
NETDEBTISSUE/K between   2.743 n =    4,674 
  within   1.859 T-bar = 6.539 
Internal Finance overall 1.302 4.887 N =   30,562 
INTERNF/K between   5.698 n =    4,674 
  within   2.645 T-bar = 6.539 
Tobin's q overall 1.927 2.572 N =   30,562 
Q between   3.317 n =    4,674 
  within   1.424 T-bar = 6.539 
Narrow or core offshoring overall 0.024 0.028 N =   30,562 
COREOFF between   0.028 n =    4,674 
  within   0.005 T-bar = 6.539 
Non-core non-energy offshoring overall 0.028 0.018 N =   30,562 
NONCORENONENERGYOFF between   0.017 n =    4,674 
  within   0.005 T-bar = 6.539 
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Table 5. Correlation Matrix 
Variable name Variable label 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Capital expenditures ln(I/K)i,t-1 1.000                         
2. Profits ln(π/K)i,t-1 0.016 1.000                       
3. Sales ln(S/K)i,t-1 0.313 0.274 1.000                     
4. Long Term Debt ln(LONGDEBT/K)i,t 0.234 0.039 0.457 1.000                   
5. Interest Expenditure ln(INTEXP/K)i,t-1 0.217 -0.215 0.410 0.671 1.000                 
6. Interest and Investment Income ln(INTINC/K)i,t-1 0.238 -0.258 0.166 0.272 0.281 1.000               
7. Dividends ln(DIV/K)i,t-1 -0.006 0.227 0.135 0.105 0.037 0.023 1.000             
8. Stock Issue ln(STKISSUE/K)i,t-1 0.252 -0.374 0.167 0.212 0.354 0.379 -0.025 1.000           
9. Stock Repurchase ln(STKREP/K)i,t-1 0.126 0.261 0.228 0.164 0.052 0.127 0.223 0.062 1.000         
10. Net Debt Issue ln(NETDEBTISSUE/K)i,t-1 0.162 -0.144 0.011 0.240 0.156 0.071 0.004 0.086 0.093 1.000       
11. Internal Finance ln(INTERNF/K)i,t-1 0.330 -0.164 0.387 0.376 0.345 0.673 0.060 0.502 0.197 0.081 1.000     
12. Tobin's q ln(Q)i,t-1 0.132 -0.202 0.019 0.073 0.204 0.117 0.031 0.286 0.062 0.102 0.182 1.000   
13. Narrow or core offshoring ln(COREOFF)j,t-1 0.038 -0.077 -0.005 -0.003 0.021 0.127 0.030 0.107 0.024 0.010 0.198 0.089 1.000 
14. Non-core non-energy offshoring ln(NONCORENONENERGYOFF)j,t-1 -0.085 0.051 -0.004 -0.017 -0.042 -0.049 0.071 -0.064 -0.016 -0.039 -0.024 -0.040 0.483 
  39  
 
Table 6. Estimation results based on equations (1) and (2). Period: 1995-2011. 
Dependent 
variable:ln(I/K)i,t 
Financialisation model Financialisation and offshoring model High non-core non-energy offshoring sectors Low non-core none-nergy offshoring sectors 
All Large Small All Large Small All Large Small All Large Small 
ln(I/K)i,t-1 0.239*** 0.318*** 0.185*** 0.240*** 0.322*** 0.180*** 0.205*** 0.165*** 0.155*** 0.242*** 0.378*** 0.157*** 
  (0.017) (0.032) (0.018) (0.016) (0.031) (0.018) (0.020) (0.049) (0.023) (0.022) (0.039) (0.027) 
ln(π/K)i,t-1 0.015** 0.036*** 0.011 0.015** 0.036*** 0.013* 0.019** 0.019 0.016 0.006 0.042*** 0.000 
  (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) 
ln(S/K)i,t-1 0.031*** 0.034* 0.033** 0.028** 0.036* 0.032** 0.039*** 0.092*** 0.024 0.034** -0.011 0.057*** 
  (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) (0.011) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) (0.017) 
ln(LONGDEBT/K)i,t -0.010 -0.000 -0.007 -0.009 0.001 -0.006 0.009 0.034** 0.002 -0.010 -0.014 -0.013 
  (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) 
ln(Q)i,t-1 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.073*** 0.066*** 0.074*** 0.056*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) 
ln(INTEXP/K)i,t-1 0.003 -0.033 0.011 0.005 -0.035 0.008 -0.005 -0.084* 0.005 0.003 0.007 -0.013 
  (0.017) (0.034) (0.019) (0.016) (0.032) (0.018) (0.022) (0.046) (0.025) (0.020) (0.035) (0.023) 
ln(INTINC/K)i,t-1 0.006 0.040 0.030 0.008 0.020 0.035 0.090** 0.056 0.087 -0.075* -0.027 -0.062 
  (0.025) (0.038) (0.028) (0.025) (0.037) (0.028) (0.043) (0.050) (0.065) (0.040) (0.057) (0.056) 
ln(DIV/K)i,t-1 -0.050* -0.056 -0.034 -0.045 -0.056 -0.034 -0.081** -0.098** -0.080* 0.004 -0.024 0.014 
  (0.029) (0.043) (0.036) (0.029) (0.044) (0.037) (0.032) (0.045) (0.047) (0.037) (0.059) (0.035) 
ln(STKISSUE/K)i,t-1 0.020*** 0.012** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.012** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.008 0.025*** 0.009* 0.009 0.011* 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
ln(STKREP/K)i,t-1 -0.009 -0.016** -0.013 -0.009 -0.016** -0.014 -0.015* -0.010 -0.014 -0.002 -0.015 0.005 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) 
ln(NETDEBT 0.007*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006** 0.003 0.008** -0.001 0.009*** 0.007* 0.008*** 
ISSUE/K)i,t-1 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
ln(INTERNF/K)i,t-1 0.043*** 0.031*** 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.034*** 0.053*** 0.033*** 0.027* 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.036*** 0.057*** 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
ln(COREOFF)i,t-1       0.026** 0.012 0.009 0.023 0.026 0.033 0.010 0.004 0.011 
        (0.013) (0.010) (0.022) (0.014) (0.017) (0.023) (0.011) (0.008) (0.022) 
ln(NONCORE       -0.039** -0.013 -0.019 -0.029 -0.026 -0.050 0.030** 0.016 0.055 
NONENERGYOFF)i,t-1       (0.018) (0.015) (0.029) (0.018) (0.019) (0.031) (0.015) (0.010) (0.038) 
N. obs 30562 15282 15280 30562 15282 15280 16299 7874 8425 14263 7408 6855 
N. firms 4674 2119 3211 4674 2119 3211 2659 1204 1832 2687 1252 1743 
Instruments 375 375 375 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 
ar1p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ar2p 0.060 0.872 0.106 0.058 0.840 0.124 0.081 0.977 0.255 0.285 0.145 0.317 
hansenp 0.001 0.010 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.013 0.024 0.300 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Age yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Large and small are those firms in the upper and lower median of total asset. High and low offshoring sectors are those belonging upper and lower median of non-core non-energy offshoring. Estimations are all obtained by the 
Arellano-Bond two-step difference GMM. All instruments include up to two-years lags. ar1p and ar2p are Arellano-Bond test of first order and second order autocorrelation in the errors. hansep is the Hansen-Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions. P-values are reported for all tests. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% 
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Table 7. Estimation results based on equation (2). Periods: 1995-2002 and 2003-2011. 
 1995-2002 2003-2011 
Dependent 
variable:ln(I/K)i,t 
High non-core non-energy offshoring sectors Low non-core non-energy offshoring sectors High non-core non-energy offshoring sectors Low non-core non-energy offshoring sectors 
All Large Small All Large Small All Large Small All Large Small 
ln(I/K)i,t-1 0.218*** 0.143** 0.213*** 0.223*** 0.339*** 0.101** 0.140*** 0.151*** 0.070* 0.244*** 0.347*** 0.158*** 
  (0.028) (0.060) (0.030) (0.039) (0.055) (0.047) (0.036) (0.057) (0.039) (0.031) (0.061) (0.035) 
ln(π/K)i,t-1 0.030** 0.031 0.018 0.003 0.072*** -0.014 0.001 0.022 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 
  (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) 
ln(S/K)i,t-1 -0.011 0.081* -0.012 0.059** -0.026 0.104*** 0.087*** 0.070*** 0.056* 0.039* 0.044* 0.047* 
  (0.019) (0.042) (0.023) (0.029) (0.035) (0.033) (0.026) (0.025) (0.034) (0.021) (0.027) (0.024) 
ln(LONGDEBT/K)i,t -0.010 0.028 -0.010 -0.023 -0.041** -0.022 0.030* 0.023 0.022 -0.004 0.003 -0.012 
  (0.017) (0.031) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) 
ln(Q)i,t-1 0.110*** 0.073*** 0.126*** 0.059*** 0.047*** 0.060*** 0.047*** 0.105*** 0.034** 0.059*** 0.051*** 0.041** 
  (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) 
ln(INTEXP/K)i,t-1 0.012 -0.108 0.008 -0.045 0.021 -0.053 -0.019 0.007 0.007 0.021 0.016 0.016 
  (0.028) (0.091) (0.034) (0.049) (0.066) (0.050) (0.032) (0.042) (0.038) (0.025) (0.040) (0.028) 
ln(INTINC/K)i,t-1 0.123* 0.102 0.098 -0.075 -0.115 0.052 0.116* -0.075 0.153** -0.081* 0.036 -0.104* 
  (0.069) (0.080) (0.091) (0.100) (0.146) (0.102) (0.063) (0.070) (0.077) (0.044) (0.062) (0.060) 
ln(DIV/K)i,t-1 -0.081** -0.068 -0.072 -0.002 -0.048 0.020 -0.091* -0.081 -0.091 0.015 -0.013 0.014 
  (0.041) (0.059) (0.061) (0.059) (0.129) (0.056) (0.053) (0.055) (0.086) (0.052) (0.061) (0.050) 
ln(STKISSUE/K)i,t-1 0.022*** -0.001 0.023*** 0.009 -0.002 0.013 0.028*** 0.006 0.024** 0.010* 0.013* 0.009 
  (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
ln(STKREP/K)i,t-1 -0.026* -0.022 -0.035* -0.013 -0.024 -0.013 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.014 0.009 
  (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.030) (0.010) (0.009) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) 
ln(NETDEBT 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.011** 0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.010*** -0.006 0.009*** 0.006* 0.010*** 
ISSUE/K)i,t-1 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
ln(INTERNF/K)i,t-1 0.067*** 0.064** 0.073*** 0.053*** 0.046** 0.045*** 0.022 -0.011 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.019 0.050*** 
  (0.015) (0.028) (0.019) (0.015) (0.022) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) 
ln(COREOFF)i,t-1 0.113*** 0.095* 0.106 -0.000 0.006 0.023 0.005 0.019 0.003 0.008 0.013 -0.052 
  (0.044) (0.052) (0.074) (0.022) (0.024) (0.036) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.016) (0.009) (0.040) 
ln(NONCORE -0.202** -0.257*** -0.272* -0.017 0.032* -0.082 -0.013 -0.018 -0.026 0.047** 0.017 0.138** 
NONENERGYOFF)i,t-1 (0.082) (0.080) (0.154) (0.030) (0.019) (0.076) (0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.023) (0.013) (0.057) 
N. obs 7404 3525 3879 6133 3244 2889 8895 4349 4546 8130 4164 3966 
N. firms 2033 945 1247 1914 976 1095 1941 904 1253 1924 874 1202 
Instruments 172 172 172 172 172 172 261 261 261 261 261 261 
ar1p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ar2p 0.218 0.485 0.466 0.693 0.186 0.516 0.117 0.933 0.223 0.242 0.295 0.449 
hansenp 0.063 0.037 0.113 0.003 0.030 0.127 0.002 0.017 0.045 0.021 0.001 0.095 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Age yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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Large and small are those firms in the upper and lower median of total asset. High and low offshoring sectors are those belonging upper and lower median of non-core non-energy offshoring. Estimations are all obtained by the 
Arellano-Bond two-step difference GMM. All instruments include up to two-years lags. ar1p and ar2p are Arellano-Bond test of first order and second order autocorrelation in the errors. hansep is the Hansen-Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions. P-values are reported for all tests. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% 
Table 8. Estimation results based on equation (2), different quartiles of non-core non-energy offshoring. Period: 1995-2011. 
Dependent 
variable:ln(I/K)i,t 
Top 25% non-core non-energy 
offshoring sectors 
75%-50% non-core non-energy 
offshoring sectors 
50%-25% non-core non-energy 
offshoring sectors 
Low 25% non-core non-energy 
offshoring sectors 
Low 25% non-core non-energy offshoring sectors 
without retail, whosale trade and utilities  
All Large Small All Large Small All Large Small All Large Small All Large Small 
ln(I/K)i,t-1 0.172*** 0.112 0.115*** 0.148*** 0.104** 0.093*** 0.219*** 0.258*** 0.123*** 0.161*** 0.352*** 0.049 0.143*** 0.362*** 0.024 
  (0.030) (0.072) (0.031) (0.026) (0.050) (0.033) (0.031) (0.037) (0.040) (0.035) (0.076) (0.037) (0.044) (0.101) (0.043) 
ln(π/K)i,t-1 0.026** 0.034*** 0.025** 0.014 0.043*** 0.003 -0.012 0.028* -0.013 0.005 0.047*** 0.003 0.008 0.041*** 0.005 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) 
ln(S/K)i,t-1 0.041** 0.070*** 0.037* 0.028** 0.022 0.025* 0.049*** -0.009 0.058*** 0.040* -0.008 0.057** 0.033 -0.025 0.045* 
  (0.018) (0.026) (0.020) (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.030) (0.026) (0.023) (0.034) (0.024) 
ln(LONGDEBT/K)i,t 0.009 0.049** -0.003 0.010 -0.008 0.005 -0.002 -0.014 -0.002 0.011 -0.001 0.012 0.014 0.013 0.017 
  (0.013) (0.024) (0.016) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) 
ln(Q)i,t-1 0.069*** 0.082*** 0.049** 0.075*** 0.060*** 0.073*** 0.061*** 0.070*** 0.043** 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.036** 0.044*** 0.032** 0.037* 
  (0.015) (0.017) (0.023) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) 
ln(INTEXP/K)i,t-1 -0.029 -0.065 -0.019 0.023 -0.108** 0.015 -0.020 -0.045 -0.016 0.038 0.061 0.019 0.040 0.097** 0.013 
  (0.024) (0.054) (0.027) (0.029) (0.051) (0.030) (0.027) (0.043) (0.029) (0.024) (0.045) (0.025) (0.027) (0.044) (0.025) 
ln(INTINC/K)i,t-1 0.034 -0.042 0.137* 0.026 0.172*** -0.019 -0.087 -0.043 -0.049 -0.020 0.069 -0.040 -0.034 0.110 -0.084 
  (0.050) (0.077) (0.073) (0.036) (0.065) (0.062) (0.072) (0.042) (0.078) (0.057) (0.085) (0.071) (0.070) (0.106) (0.081) 
ln(DIV/K)i,t-1 -0.060 -0.087 0.016 -0.117** 0.023 -0.131** 0.008 0.012 0.023 0.005 -0.000 0.013 0.059 0.139 0.047 
  (0.045) (0.057) (0.053) (0.054) (0.046) (0.063) (0.049) (0.092) (0.066) (0.048) (0.120) (0.051) (0.058) (0.124) (0.055) 
ln(STKISSUE/K)i,t-1 0.032*** 0.002 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.008 0.026*** 0.015** 0.009 0.019*** 0.009 0.018** 0.001 0.005 0.029** -0.007 
  (0.008) (0.018) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) 
ln(STKREP/K)i,t-1 -0.021* -0.009 -0.013 -0.018 -0.011 -0.020 0.022 0.014 0.032 -0.000 -0.028** 0.002 -0.009 -0.025 0.000 
  (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.023) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) 
ln(NETDEBT 0.004 0.008 -0.000 0.002 0.009* -0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.016** 0.011** 
ISSUE/K)i,t-1 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
ln(INTERNF/K)i,t-1 0.025** 0.025 0.036** 0.057*** 0.035** 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.008 0.073*** 0.059*** 0.017 0.090*** 
  (0.011) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) 
ln(COREOFF)i,t-1 -0.019 0.003 -0.011 0.002 0.007 -0.007 0.000 0.010 -0.029 -0.007 0.004 -0.024 -0.007 0.016 -0.044 
  (0.015) (0.021) (0.024) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023) (0.011) (0.008) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) 
ln(NONCORE -0.007 -0.023 -0.008 -0.022 -0.038* -0.022 0.028** 0.015 0.098*** 0.025* 0.017 0.059** 0.017 -0.009 0.046 
NONENERGYOFF)i,t-1 (0.022) (0.023) (0.034) (0.022) (0.020) (0.037) (0.013) (0.014) (0.035) (0.015) (0.020) (0.030) (0.032) (0.039) (0.058) 
N. obs 9781 4813 4968 6518 3061 3457 8140 4293 3847 6123 3115 3008 3585 1370 2215 
N. firms 1731 797 1149 1683 753 1130 1845 931 1099 1377 627 891 785 264 614 
Instruments 433 433 433 432 431 432 433 433 433 432 432 432 429 428 429 
ar1p 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
ar2p 0.475 0.807 0.824 0.234 0.440 0.288 0.616 0.006 0.549 0.443 0.988 0.735 0.689 0.967 0.921 
hansenp 0.008 0.020 0.180 0.002 0.047 0.054 0.002 0.024 0.077 0.122 0.062 0.173 0.252 1.000 0.312 
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Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Age yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Large and small are those firms in the upper and lower median of total asset. High and low offshoring sectors are those belonging upper and lower median of non-core non-energy offshoring. Estimations are all obtained by the 
Arellano-Bond two-step difference GMM. All instruments include up to two-years lags. ar1p and ar2p are Arellano-Bond test of first order and second order autocorrelation in the errors. hansep is the Hansen-Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions. P-values are reported for all tests. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% 
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Appendix  
Table A1. Definitions of variables in figures and estimations 
Variable Source 
Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 5, Table 3 
Net Financial Payouts - U.S. Economy =  Dividends Paid -  Equity and Investment Fund Shares 
Financial Accounts of 
the USA, Table Z.1 
Investment - U.S. Economy =  Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
Financial Accounts of 
the USA, Table Z.1 
Net Financial Payouts - U.S. Listed Firms =  Stock Repurchases + Dividends Paid -  Share Buybacks 
Compustat Data 
Items 115, 127 and 
108 
Investment - U.S. Listed Firms =  Capital Expenditures 
Compustat Data Item 
128 




Operating Surplus - U.S. Economy = Net Operating Surplus + Consumption of Fixed Capital, Structures, 
Equipment, and Intellectual Property Products, including Equity REIT Residential Structures  
Financial Accounts of 
the USA, Table Z.1 
Operating Surplus - U.S. Listed Firms = Pretax income - Income Taxes + Interest Expense + Depreciation 
and Amortization 
Compustat Data 
Items 170, 16, 15, 14  
Figure 3 
U.S. Outward FDI stock OECD 
U.S. Outward FDI flow 
Financial Accounts of 
the USA, Table Z.1 
Estimations 
Capital Expenditures 
Compustat Data Item 
128 
Net Property, Plant and Equipment 
Compustat Data Item 
8 
Operating Income 
Compustat Data Item 
13 
Sales 




Items 6, 34, 142 
Long Debt 
Compustat Data Item 
142 
Interest Expense 
Compustat Data Item 
15 
Interest and Investment Income 
Compustat Data 
Items 62, 55 
Cash Dividends 
Compustat Data Item 
127 
Sale of Common and Preferred Stock 
Compustat Data Item 
108 
Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock 
Compustat Data Item 
115 
Net Debt Issue 
Compustat Data 
Items 111, 114, 301 
Internal Finance 
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Table A2. Estimation results based on equations (1) and (2), instruments collapsed. Period: 1995-2011. 
Dependent 
variable:ln(I/K)i,t 
Financialisation model Financialisation and offshoring model High non-core non-energy offshoring sectors Low non-core non-energy offshoring sectors 
All Large Small All Large Small All Large Small All Large Small 
ln(I/K)i,t-1 0.274*** 0.386*** 0.219*** 0.270*** 0.389*** 0.219*** 0.230*** 0.254*** 0.200*** 0.301*** 0.507*** 0.221*** 
  (0.018) (0.041) (0.020) (0.018) (0.041) (0.020) (0.026) (0.062) (0.026) (0.029) (0.057) (0.033) 
ln(π/K)i,t-1 0.012 0.045*** 0.005 0.014* 0.053*** 0.007 0.022* 0.036* 0.017 0.009 0.067*** 0.002 
  (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.022) (0.011) 
ln(S/K)i,t-1 0.018 -0.031 0.027* 0.013 -0.044 0.025 0.035 -0.019 0.034 -0.017 -0.129*** 0.008 
  (0.014) (0.031) (0.016) (0.014) (0.030) (0.017) (0.023) (0.048) (0.027) (0.023) (0.041) (0.028) 
ln(LONGDEBT/K)i,t -0.007 0.004 -0.015 -0.009 -0.010 -0.012 0.012 -0.047 0.025 -0.032** -0.038* -0.043** 
  (0.012) (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.023) (0.015) (0.019) (0.039) (0.021) (0.015) (0.022) (0.020) 
ln(Q)i,t-1 0.062*** 0.073*** 0.057*** 0.062*** 0.075*** 0.058*** 0.051*** 0.068*** 0.049*** 0.072*** 0.080*** 0.064*** 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) 
ln(INTEXP/K)i,t-1 -0.001 0.011 -0.007 0.001 0.006 -0.003 -0.007 -0.033 0.010 0.032 0.123** 0.004 
  (0.020) (0.040) (0.023) (0.021) (0.041) (0.023) (0.027) (0.054) (0.030) (0.034) (0.048) (0.039) 
ln(INTINC/K)i,t-1 0.008 0.090* 0.002 0.012 0.113** -0.003 0.081 0.204*** 0.075 -0.028 0.073 -0.016 
  (0.040) (0.053) (0.050) (0.040) (0.053) (0.050) (0.050) (0.074) (0.062) (0.073) (0.092) (0.084) 
ln(DIV/K)i,t-1 -0.076** -0.108** -0.052 -0.072** -0.090* -0.048 -0.077* -0.089 0.002 -0.061 0.012 -0.045 
  (0.034) (0.052) (0.043) (0.034) (0.053) (0.043) (0.043) (0.057) (0.067) (0.055) (0.104) (0.060) 
ln(STKISSUE/K)i,t-1 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.014** 0.006 0.012 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
ln(STKREP/K)i,t-1 -0.015** -0.020* -0.012 -0.014* -0.024** -0.011 -0.024** -0.038*** -0.028* -0.006 -0.009 0.003 
  (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) 
ln(NETDEBT 0.006** 0.006* 0.005* 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006* 0.002 0.008* -0.001 0.010*** 0.008* 0.011*** 
ISSUE/K)i,t-1 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
ln(INTERNF/K)i,t-1 0.050*** 0.017 0.062*** 0.046*** 0.011 0.060*** 0.034*** -0.001 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.033* 0.060*** 
  (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) 
ln(COREOFF)i,t-1     0.036 -0.031 0.059 0.044 0.347 0.118 0.078 -0.023 0.103 
        (0.049) (0.049) (0.090) (0.182) (0.248) (0.230) (0.057) (0.056) (0.099) 
ln(NONCORE     0.061 0.054 0.056 0.025 -0.207 -0.061 0.140*** 0.087** 0.266*** 
NONENERGYOFF)i,t-1     (0.083) (0.072) (0.172) (0.100) (0.171) (0.125) (0.044) (0.037) (0.098) 
N. obs 30562 15282 15280 30562 15282 15280 16299 7874 8425 14263 7408 6855 
N. firms 4674 2119 3211 4674 2119 3211 2659 1204 1832 2687 1252 1743 
Instruments 39 39 39 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
ar1p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ar2p 0.021 0.802 0.052 0.020 0.889 0.041 0.044 0.913 0.117 0.117 0.076 0.113 
hansenp 0.035 0.281 0.117 0.020 0.089 0.107 0.161 0.070 0.263 0.043 0.375 0.245 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Age yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Large and small are those firms in the upper and lower median of total asset. High and low offshoring sectors are those belonging upper and lower median of non-core non-energy offshoring. Estimations are all 
obtained by the Arellano-Bond two-step difference GMM. All instruments include up to two-years lags. ar1p and ar2p are Arellano-Bond test of first order and second order autocorrelation in the errors. hansep is 
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the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. P-values are reported for all tests. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% 
Table A3. Estimation results based on equations (1) and (2), without nonsignificant variables. Period: 1995-2011. 
Dependent 
variable:ln(I/K)i,t 
Financialisation model Financialisation and offshoring model High non-core non-energy offshoring sectors Low non-core non-energy offshoring sectors 
All Large Small All Large Small All Large Small All Large Small 
ln(I/K)i,t-1 0.246*** 0.324*** 0.192*** 0.246*** 0.329*** 0.187*** 0.216*** 0.203*** 0.164*** 0.250*** 0.379*** 0.184*** 
  (0.016) (0.030) (0.017) (0.016) (0.028) (0.017) (0.020) (0.043) (0.023) (0.022) (0.036) (0.025) 
ln(π/K)i,t-1 0.017** 0.053*** 0.009 0.017** 0.050*** 0.011 0.026*** 0.035** 0.019* 0.011 0.052*** 0.007 
  (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) 
ln(S/K)i,t-1 0.026** 0.004 0.032*** 0.023** 0.009 0.029** 0.038*** 0.052* 0.023* 0.015 -0.009 0.030** 
  (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.028) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) 
ln(LONGDEBT/K)i,t                       
                          
ln(Q)i,t-1 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.081*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
ln(INTEXP/K)i,t-1                       
                          
ln(INTINC/K)i,t-1                       
                          
ln(DIV/K)i,t-1 -0.051* -0.039 -0.033 -0.044 -0.041 -0.031 -0.072** -0.087** -0.057 -0.011 -0.017 -0.009 
  (0.031) (0.039) (0.037) (0.030) (0.040) (0.038) (0.032) (0.041) (0.048) (0.039) (0.069) (0.035) 
ln(STKISSUE/K)i,t-1 0.018*** 0.010* 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.009* 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.011 0.023*** 0.007 0.006 0.008 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
ln(STKREP/K)i,t-1 -0.008 -0.013** -0.015 -0.008 -0.014** -0.015 -0.014* -0.015 -0.012 -0.004 -0.012 -0.004 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) 
ln(NETDEBT 0.004* 0.007*** 0.003 0.004** 0.007** 0.003 0.001 0.012*** -0.003 0.007*** 0.005* 0.007** 
ISSUE/K)i,t-1 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ln(INTERNF/K)i,t-1 0.047*** 0.030*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.032*** 0.055*** 0.039*** 0.018 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.032** 0.056*** 
  (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) 
ln(COREOFF)i,t-1     0.021 0.015 0.012 0.021 0.030* 0.030 0.007 0.012 0.016 
        (0.013) (0.011) (0.022) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.011) (0.008) (0.022) 
ln(NONCORE     -0.046** -0.012 -0.020 -0.020 -0.024 -0.047 0.052*** 0.011 0.072* 
NONENERGYOFF)i,t-1     (0.019) (0.017) (0.029) (0.017) (0.019) (0.029) (0.017) (0.010) (0.039) 
N. obs 30562 15282 15280 30562 15282 15280 16299 7874 8425 14263 7408 6855 
N. firms 4674 2119 3211 4674 2119 3211 2659 1204 1832 2687 1252 1743 
Instruments 285 285 285 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 
ar1p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ar2p 0.055 0.984 0.103 0.057 0.917 0.117 0.059 0.747 0.192 0.255 0.153 0.185 
hansenp 0.001 0.033 0.057 0.000 0.001 0.108 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.022 0.028 0.537 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Age yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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Large and small are those firms in the upper and lower median of total asset. High and low offshoring sectors are those belonging upper and lower median of non-core non-energy offshoring. Estimations are all 
obtained by the Arellano-Bond two-step difference GMM. All instruments include up to two-years lags. ar1p and ar2p are Arellano-Bond test of first order and second order autocorrelation in the errors. hansep is 
the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. P-values are reported for all tests. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% 
Table A4. Estimation results based on equations (1) and (2), different sizes. Period: 1995-2011. 
Dependent 
variable:ln(I/K)i,t 
Financialisation model Financialisation and offshoring model High non-core non-energy offshoring sectors Low non-core non-energy offshoring sectors 
Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small 
ln(I/K)i,t-1 0.355*** 0.134*** 0.346*** 0.119*** 0.177*** 0.074** 0.376*** 0.051 
  (0.049) (0.022) (0.047) (0.022) (0.065) (0.029) (0.061) (0.036) 
ln(π/K)i,t-1 0.020 0.008 0.016 0.008 0.054*** 0.006 0.003 0.000 
  (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.018) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) 
ln(S/K)i,t-1 0.004 0.036** 0.009 0.043*** -0.000 0.018 0.000 0.073*** 
  (0.023) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.023) (0.014) (0.026) (0.019) 
ln(LONGDEBT/K)i,t 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.047* 0.004 -0.008 0.009 
  (0.019) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.028) (0.014) (0.021) (0.016) 
ln(Q)i,t-1 0.053*** 0.064*** 0.057*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.069*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 
  (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016) 
ln(INTEXP/K)i,t-1 -0.128*** 0.016 -0.136*** 0.008 -0.124** 0.023 -0.050 -0.007 
  (0.048) (0.021) (0.046) (0.019) (0.053) (0.022) (0.070) (0.025) 
ln(INTINC/K)i,t-1 -0.045 0.021 -0.059 0.023 0.048 0.072 -0.068 -0.073 
  (0.076) (0.031) (0.075) (0.029) (0.084) (0.058) (0.075) (0.052) 
ln(DIV/K)i,t-1 -0.082 -0.007 -0.074 -0.012 -0.064 -0.044 -0.142 0.017 
  (0.099) (0.045) (0.100) (0.046) (0.062) (0.058) (0.124) (0.065) 
ln(STKISSUE/K)i,t-1 0.010 0.018*** 0.009 0.017*** 0.011 0.029*** 0.008 0.012 
  (0.013) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.009) 
ln(STKREP/K)i,t-1 -0.021* -0.011 -0.023** -0.013 -0.030* -0.014 -0.017 -0.005 
  (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.014) (0.024) 
ln(NETDEBT 0.013*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.001 0.015** -0.002 0.018** 0.005 
ISSUE/K)i,t-1 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) 
ln(INTERNF/K)i,t-1 0.039*** 0.069*** 0.040*** 0.068*** 0.025 0.064*** 0.043** 0.066*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) 
ln(COREOFF)i,t-1     0.013 0.011 0.061* 0.044 0.023*** -0.038 
      (0.012) (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) (0.009) (0.037) 
ln(NONCORE     0.014 -0.059 -0.037 0.002 0.019* 0.095 
NONENERGYOFF)i,t-1     (0.012) (0.045) (0.028) (0.045) (0.011) (0.079) 
N. obs 7643 7640 7643 7640 3783 4284 3860 3356 
N. firms 1019 1910 1019 1910 586 1090 616 1006 
Instruments 375 375 433 433 433 433 433 433 
ar1p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ar2p 0.893 0.258 0.877 0.332 0.657 0.572 0.323 0.699 
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hansenp 0.027 0.441 0.037 0.591 0.073 0.198 0.239 0.517 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Age yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Large and small are those firms in the upper and lower 25% of total asset. High and low offshoring sectors are those belonging upper and lower median of non-core non-energy offshoring. Estimations are all obtained 
by the Arellano-Bond two-step difference GMM. All instruments include up to two-years lags. ar1p and ar2p are Arellano-Bond test of first order and second order autocorrelation in the errors. hansep is the Hansen-
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. P-values are reported for all tests. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1% 
 
